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Abstract: In the past few years, we have witnessed a rise
in the popularity of ride-hailing services (RHSs), an on-
line marketplace that enables accredited drivers to use
their own cars to drive ride-hailing users. Unlike other
transportation services, RHSs raise significant privacy con-
cerns, as providers are able to track the precise mobility
patterns of millions of riders worldwide. We present the
first survey and analysis of the privacy threats in RHSs.
Our analysis exposes high-risk privacy threats that do
not occur in conventional taxi services. Therefore, we pro-
pose PrivateRide, a privacy-enhancing and practical solu-
tion that offers anonymity and location privacy for riders,
and protects drivers’ information from harvesting attacks.
PrivateRide lowers the high-risk privacy threats in RHSs to
a level that is at least as low as that of many taxi ser-
vices. Using real data-sets from Uber and taxi rides, we
show that PrivateRide significantly enhances riders’ privacy,
while preserving tangible accuracy in ride matching and
fare calculation, with only negligible effects on convenience.
Moreover, by using our Android implementation for exper-
imental evaluations, we show that PrivateRide’s overhead
during ride setup is negligible. In short, we enable privacy-
conscious riders to achieve levels of privacy that are not
possible in current RHSs and even in some conventional
taxi services, thereby offering a potential business differen-
tiator.
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1 Introduction
Over the last few years, the popularity of RHSs, such as
Uber and Lyft, has significantly increased, serving millions
of users in hundreds of cities [1]. These services provide an
efficient marketplace where users can register themselves
as drivers (to provide rides) and/or riders (to hail rides);
the service provider (SP) matches ride requests with avail-
able drivers. More importantly, by relying on smartphones
and mobile apps, RHSs bring substantial improvements to
the ride-hailing experience by facilitating the requests, the
paying for and the rating of the rides.
Unfortunately, along with the high convenience of
RHSs come some important privacy concerns. In contrast
with traditional taxi services, SPs in RHSs collect the
details of each ride, including location traces, together
with the rider’s real identity. Note that other forms of
transportation, such as taxis and private cars, also leak
private information. They, however, require the SPs to do
extra and error-prone operations (e.g., image processing
for face/licence plate recognition) to identify users and
their activities. Therefore, data collection in RHSs is more
efficient and large-scale. As a result, the SP, or any third-
party with access to this data, can infer privacy-sensitive
information such as where riders live, work, and socialize.
Unsurprisingly, a number of unethical uses of this data
have already been reported: analysis of user trajectories to
discover patterns of one-night stands [49], monitoring of
the location of riders in real-time for entertainment [27],
and even revenge attacks against journalists critical of
such services [64]. This problem is exacerbated by the fact
that SPs often share or sell this data to third-parties [29].
In addition, drivers’ privacy is also at risk. As our pri-
vacy analysis reveals (Section 3), current RHSs do little
to prevent adversaries from massively harvesting informa-
tion about the drivers. Such information could be used by
traditional taxi drivers to coordinate physical attacks [23].
In this paper, we analyze the privacy threats in RHSs
and propose a privacy-enhanced RHS, PrivateRide; it pro-
tects riders’ anonymity and location privacy, while main-
taining most of the benefits of current RHSs, i.e., account-
ability, automatic payments, and reputation ratings. We
perform the first privacy analysis of RHSs, develop a threat
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taxonomy, and focus on two critical threats: location track-
ing of riders by the SP and harvesting of drivers’ personal
information by an external adversary. To target these
threats, PrivateRide provides riders with anonymity and
unlinkability with respect to the SP and drivers.
PrivateRide relies on well-known cryptographic and
privacy-enhancing building blocks (e.g., anonymous creden-
tials, blind signatures, e-cash, location and time cloaking).
These building blocks are carefully composed to achieve
our privacy and security goals, as well as to support RHSs’
key services: ride matching, fare calculation and estima-
tion, reputation rating for drivers and riders, payments,
and accountability. Note that our contribution is not the
design of new techniques, rather the selection, composition,
and evaluation of well-known, simple, and efficient tech-
niques. Such an approach is crucial for deployment in real
systems because these techniques are easier to understand
and accept by users and developers.
To evaluate PrivateRide’s privacy gains and effects on
usability, we use real data-sets from NYC taxi rides [63]
and SF Uber [32]. We show that, at peak hours in Manhat-
tan, our location and time cloaking techniques can provide
an anonymity set of 4 and 10 for 80% and 40% of the
rides, respectively (Section 6); thus, hindering strong tar-
geted attacks where the adversary knows the approximate
time and location a particular rider hailed a ride. More-
over, it is easy to see that cloaking offers a robust defense
against large-scale inference attacks, where the adversary
has much less information about the riders (e.g., analysis
of one-night stands [49]). Note that PrivateRide offers by
default a lower-bound anonymity set to all riders. Privacy-
conscious riders can take actions to improve their privacy,
e.g., by walking to a more crowded cloaked area to hail a
ride. Furthermore, we demonstrate that PrivateRide has a
negligible effect on usability. We observe that 95% of the
rides have less than 10% error on fare calculation, and 80%
of the rides introduce less than 100 m of overhead on the
total pick-up distance (Section 8). In addition, by using
PrivateRide’s Android implementation, we show that the
added overhead is negligible, i.e., just a few seconds (most
ride-hailing operation take minutes [28]).
In short, our main contributions are:
– We present the first general privacy analysis of RHSs.
By analyzing currently deployed RHSs, we develop a
threat taxonomy and identify high-risk threats, par-
ticularly the unreported threat of drivers’ personal
information being harvested.
– We propose PrivateRide, the first practical system that
offers enhanced privacy for riders and drivers, without
affecting the convenience of these services or the SP’s
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Fig. 1. Information collected by the SP per ride for cur-
rent RHSs and PrivateRide. PrivateRide cloaks rides’ sensitive
information to protect against reidentification attacks.
economic incentives. To facilitate adoption, we rely
exclusively on well-established, efficient cryptographic
and privacy-enhancing primitives.
– We analyze and evaluate, by using real data-sets,
PrivateRide’s privacy guarantees and effect on usabil-
ity. We show that PrivateRide offers significant privacy
gains for all riders and a means for privacy-conscious
riders to further enhance their privacy. Moreover, we
demonstrate that PrivateRide introduces a negligible
performance overhead by using our Android imple-
mentation.
Figure 1 summarizes the differences between the infor-
mation that an SP gathers per ride in current RHSs and
PrivateRide. By cloaking sensitive information, PrivateRide
makes inference attacks more difficult, i.e., an adversary
requires more side information and the SP can still benefit
from the cloaked information.
2 Ride-Hailing Services
In general, RHSs involve three parties: riders, drivers, and
a service provider (SP) (see Figure 2). The SP handles
incoming ride-requests and matches riders with available
drivers, based primarily on their locations; it also offers key
services such as fare estimation and calculation (based on
the route of the rides), ride payment and reputation man-
agement. In exchange for these services, the SP charges a
fee for each completed ride (e.g., Uber charges around 20%
of the total fare). Some SPs also sell ride data or traces to
third-parties (e.g., for city planning [15] or marketing [29]).
To use a RHS, riders and drivers need an account, a GPS-
equipped smartphone with the SP’s mobile app installed,
and an active Internet connection.
To hail a ride, the rider sends a request to the SP
by using the mobile app. The request includes the rider’s
identity and the exact pick-up and (optionally) drop-off
locations. The SP selects an available driver, based on her
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Fig. 2. Ride-hailing services overview.
proximity to the pick-up location (drivers continuously re-
port their locations to the SP while on duty). The SP sends
the request, together with the rider’s username, reputation
and phone number (for ride coordination) to the driver. If
the driver declines the request, the SP sends the request
to another available driver. Otherwise, the SP notifies the
rider and sends her back the driver’s information such as
the driver’s real name, photo, phone number, and car plate
number. The rider uses this information to decide if she
accepts the ride, as well as to coordinate the pickup.
As the driver approaches the pick-up location, the SP
shares the driver’s location and estimated time of arrival
with the rider. Once the rider is in the car, the driver
notifies the SP that the ride has begun. Both the rider
and the driver can cancel a ride at any point. However,
in certain cases, the SP can charge them a penalty fee or
lower their reputations [58] (e.g., in case of systematic ride
cancellation). Unlike the rider, the driver must keep her
smartphone switched on (with Internet and GPS connec-
tivity) during the ride, in order to report her location to
the SP. Upon reaching the destination, the driver notifies
the SP that the ride has ended. The SP computes the
fare, based on the location information reported by the
driver, and automatically charges the rider (e.g., her credit
card); the amount charged to the rider (minus the service
fees) is credited to the driver’s account. Both the driver
and rider can check the details of the ride via the mobile
app and rate each other. This operation is optional and it
can be performed within a predefined period of time that
begins right after the end of the ride. The SP uses the
reputation information to keep the quality of the service
high by detecting and punishing misbehaving parties. For
example, riders and drivers with low reputations could be
banned temporarily or permanently.
3 Privacy Analysis of RHSs
RHSs introduce significant privacy threats to riders and
drivers. In this section, we present a privacy analysis of
current RHSs and identify the most critical privacy threats
Description Risk-RH Risk-T
1) R→ D PII harvesting [2] Low Low
2) D→ R PII harvesting Low Low
3) SP→R location tracking [27, 31, 49] High Medium
4) SP→D location tracking [47] Medium Low
5) O→ R PII harvesting Medium Low
6) O→ D PII harvesting High Low
7) O→ SP PII and ride data breach [3] High Medium
Table 1. Privacy threat taxonomy for RHSs (Risk-RH)
and traditional taxi services (Risk-T) based on four
possible adversaries: riders (R), drivers (D), service
provider (SP), and outsiders (O). The notation X→Y
means X attacks Y.
in these services. Appendix A presents an analysis of in-
tegrity threats in RHSs.
3.1 Adversarial Model
We define four adversaries in current RHSs:
Rider. Active adversary who might attempt to har-
vest personally identifiable information (PII) from drivers
(e.g., for stalking or blackmailing purposes).
Driver. Active adversary who might attempt to collect
PII from riders she picks up (e.g., for stalking or blackmail-
ing purposes).
SP. Passive adversary that strives to safeguard its business
and maximize its profits. It has incentives to profile riders
and drivers and infer sensitive information about them, to
either improve its own services or to monetize harvested
data (e.g., for advertisement purposes or coercion [64]).
However, it also has incentives to prevent certain attacks,
such as data harvesting from outsiders, or pervasive fare
overcharging, as these attacks threaten the viability of the
SP’s business over its competitors. Finally, we assume the
SP has no incentive to actively cheat (e.g., by providing
a malicious app to users, or otherwise deviating from an
established protocol), if there is a non-negligible chance
of the SP being caught in the act. Indeed, the risk of
public exposure and reputation loss is a strong economic
deterrent against such attacks from the SP.
Outsider. Active adversary who tries to collect and/or
steal riders’ and drivers’ PII, account credentials, and ride
data. The malicious outsider is not part of the RHS and
might have more resources than a single driver or rider.
For instance, it could be a competitor SP, a criminal
organization, or a group of regular taxi drivers.
PrivateRide: A Privacy-Enhanced Ride-Hailing Service 4
3.2 Threat Taxonomy
We built the first threat taxonomy for privacy threats in
RHSs (Table 1). To identify these threats, we reviewed
online sources (e.g., news articles, RHSs websites, forums,
blog posts) and experimentally evaluated some of the most
popular RHSs, see Section 3.3 for more details. To estimate
the level of risk associated with each adversary and threat,
we followed the OWASP risk-rating methodology [50]
where the risk is defined as: Risk= Impact∗Likelihood. In
our risk assessment, we assume that only a small subset of
the riders and drivers are malicious. This is a reasonable
assumption, given the current success of RHSs.
In general, threats with low risks involve attacks that
are not scalable, offer limited rewards, and can be de-
terred by existing mechanisms such as decreased reputa-
tion [58, 59]. Threats with medium risks involve attacks
that have relatively higher impact, offer higher rewards,
and are more likely to happen. Threats with high risks
involve attacks that have the highest impact and reward,
have the highest likelihood and reported incidents, and
for which current defense mechanisms are insufficient. Ap-
pendix B details each threat and justifies each risk level.
In Table 1, we also show the risk levels of each privacy
threat for traditional taxi services (i.e., Risk-T). Risk lev-
els in taxi services are lower than in RHSs (i.e., Risk-RH),
because SPs in the former collect less sensitive information.
The only exceptions are taxi services where the SP collect
riders’ PII and ride details for reservations or business
analytics purposes. Hence, threats 3 and 7 in Table 1 are
rated as medium risk. In this paper, our goal is to lower
the high-risk privacy threats in RHSs to a level that is at
least as low as that of many taxi services.
From the high-risk threats in RHSs in Table 1, threat
7 is not exclusive to RHSs; data breaches affect almost
any online service. Hence, there are existing mechanisms
to reduce its risk. For example, the SP database could use
CryptDB [53] to securely store riders’ and drivers’ data.1
Therefore, in this work we focus on the high-risk threats
that occur exclusively due to the design of current RHSs
and for which there are no current solutions (i.e., threats
3 and 6 on Table 1):
SP→R location tracking. By design, an SP can track,
in real time or offline, riders’ precise locations during
their rides and infer private information from such data.
Compared with other forms of public transportation, ride-
hailing data can reveal significantly more private informa-
1 Inference attacks against CryptDB [44] do not apply in RHSs
as there is no “auxiliary database" available to adversaries.
Provider SP→R Location
tracking
O→D
PII harvesting
Uber # G#
Ola Cab # #
Lyft # G#
GrabTaxi # G#
EasyTaxi # #
Table 2. Robustness level of popular RHSs against
high-risk threats (Section 3.2). Current RHSs provide
no protection (#) or only partial protection (G#) against
these threats.
tion about millions of riders. For example, the SP and
other parties with access to this data (e.g., by agreement,
coercion or attack) can determine where riders live, work,
socialize, where exactly they go [45, 55, 61], even for
one-night stands [49]. Furthermore, there are reported inci-
dents of SP’s employees abusing such data to track riders
for entertainment [27] or revenge [64].
O→D PII harvesting. A malicious outsider could ex-
ploit privacy weaknesses in the services offered by the SP,
to efficiently collect PII of a large number of drivers. A par-
ticular weakness that could be exploited for this purpose is
that, in current RHSs, the drivers’ information is revealed
to the rider before the ride begins in order to coordinate
the pickup. Hence, an adversary could efficiently collect
drivers’ PII in a particular area by using fake rider accounts,
selecting different pickup locations, requesting and then
canceling rides. This attack can be used by shadymarketers
(e.g., loan sharks) or, even worse, angry taxi-cab drivers
trying to physically harm RHSs’ drivers [23]. The possibil-
ity of this attack was demonstrated when Uber and Lyft
employees harvested, from each other, information about
thousand of drivers for recruitment purposes [42, 60]. To
defend against this attack, the SP could define thresh-
olds on the number of canceled requests that a user can
make to the service. If a user passes this threshold, she
is banned from the service. However, an adversary could
bypass such measures by creating more fake accounts (they
are relatively easy to create) or by buying stolen accounts
on online black markets [46]. In Section 4, we present an
effective solution for this unreported high-risk threat.
3.3 Assessment of Popular RHSs
In this section, we present our experimental evaluation
of popular RHSs. In particular, we assess how well these
services deal with the two high-risk, RHS-specific threats
described in Section 3.2. For this purpose, we installed the
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rider and driver Android mobile app2 of the selected RHSs
and, when possible, made ride requests. In addition, we
reviewed the online documentation of the selected RHSs.
Table 2 presents the results.
For the SP→R location tracking threat, unsurpris-
ingly, we did not find any evidence that the evaluated
SPs provide any sort of privacy-preserving mechanisms
(e.g., pseudonyms, obfuscated ride traces, ride summaries
instead of full location trace) for protecting the privacy
and riders from inference attacks. All the evaluated SPs
collect the full location trace of each ride, together with
the riders’ and drivers’ identities.
For the O→D PII harvesting threat, we determined
how much driver information is revealed by the SP when
a ride request is made. First, all the SPs reveal the driver’s
name, phone number, current location, and car plate num-
ber; some SPs also reveal the driver’s photo and car model
and picture. Second, we checked how SPs punish riders
if they cancel rides too often, e.g., penalties or lower rep-
utation. Only Uber [59], Grabtaxi, and Lyft [58] provide
such types of penalties; this can partially deter harvesting
attacks. Reported incidents [4, 42, 60] demonstrate that
such mechanisms are insufficient.
4 Our Solution: PrivateRide
We present PrivateRide, our privacy-preserving RHS.
PrivateRide is primarily designed to deal with the high-risk,
RHS-specific threats presented in Section 3.3, i.e., SP→R
location tracking and O→D PII harvesting.
4.1 System Model
We assume a general setting for RHSs; it consists of three
parties (Section 2): the riders, the drivers, and the SP. In
particular, the SP supports three main operations: (1) ride
matching, (2) fare calculation and automatic payment,
and (3) reputation ratings for riders and drivers. More-
over, besides localization capabilities, drivers’ and riders’
smartphones support peer-to-peer wireless communication
(e.g., Bluetooth, WiFi Direct). In addition, drivers use
a third-party navigation app (e.g., Waze, Google Maps,
TomTom) that does not collude with the SP or use an
offline navigation app by pre-fetching the map of a large
area (e.g., a city or country).
2 We assume RHSs apps offer equivalent privacy and security
mechanisms on different mobile platforms.
4.2 Adversarial Assumptions
In PrivateRide, we consider the adversarial model presented
in Section 3.1. In this model, it is assumed that the SP
is honest-but-curious, and that it does not act as an en-
abler for attacks carried out by riders, drivers, or outsiders.
As already mentioned, we base these assumptions on the
following observations: (1) The SP has incentives to keep
its drivers and riders “in check” (and thus avoid threats
labeled R→ D or D→ R in Table 1); (2) the SP has incen-
tives to protect the private data of its riders and drivers
from outsiders, in order to safeguard its customer-base; and
(3) the SP’s gains from privacy-breaching attacks against
riders or drivers are heavily outweighed by potential loss of
business incurred by the public exposure of the SP’s acts.
If active attacks by the SP are likely to be detected, the
SP has incentives to resort to only passive attacks.
The latter observation actually corresponds to the
stronger covert adversary model introduced by Aumann
and Lindell [11]. As an example, consider SP’s incentives
to provide riders or drivers with a malicious smartphone
app that silently collects their data or deviates from estab-
lished privacy-preserving protocols. As the app would run
on all user’s phones, a single successful reverse-engineering
of the app’s malicious behavior (e.g., by a competitor)
would undoubtedly jeopardize the SP’s reputation, con-
sumer trust, hence its entire business model. The resulting
business damage is nearly certain in the highly competitive
world of RHSs, where it is not uncommon for competitors
to attack each other [4, 42, 60]. Therefore, our assump-
tion that an SP will refrain from such malicious behavior
and provide users with trustworthy smartphone applica-
tions is justified. Extending our full analysis to the covert
adversary model is an interesting avenue for future work.
It is also reasonable to assume that the drivers and the
SP do not collude with each other, as the drivers are not
SP’s employees in most RHSs. We also assume that the
network and upper-layer protocols do not leak the riders’
and drivers’ identifiable information to the SP. That is, the
SP cannot see the IP addresses of the riders’ and drivers’
smartphones. This assumption is practical in our system,
because most users do not have a direct public IP address.
Instead, they are usually behind a NAT offered by the
cellular provider. Otherwise, the problem of concealing IP
addresses from the SP could also be solved with anony-
mous network systems, such as Tor, or proxies. Moreover,
denial-of-service attacks (DoS) are not considered.
PrivateRide: A Privacy-Enhanced Ride-Hailing Service 6
4.3 Design Goals
This section describes the design goals of PrivateRide. That
is, if PrivateRide satisfies these goals, it is robust against
the adversarial assumptions described in Section 4.2.
(P1) Rider anonymity. It is computationally difficult
for the SP to infer riders’ real identities. This requires
the anonymity of the riders to be preserved throughout
the operations provided by the service, including logins,
payments, and reputation rating. This goal addresses the
location tracking threat (threat 3 in Table 1) .
(P2) Rider unlinkability. It is computationally difficult
for the SP to know whether two rides were hailed by the
same rider. This means the unlinkability of the riders has
to be preserved throughout the operations provided by the
service, including logins, payments, and reputation rating.
This goal addresses the location tracking threat (threat 3
in Table 1).
(P3) Harvesting-attack resistance. It is computation-
ally difficult for a malicious outsider to massively collect
riders’ and driver’s PII (e.g., drivers’ vehicle information)
operating in a region. This goal addresses the PII harvest-
ing threat (threat 6 in Table 1).
(S1) Accountability. The SP is able to revoke the
anonymity of misbehaving riders (e.g., a rider who physi-
cally attacks a driver). However, the SP does not have full
control over this re-identification operation, i.e., it is able
to do it only with the support of a driver.
(S2) Secure payment and reputation schemes. Some
riders might be more motivated to misbehave and attack
the payment and reputation systems, given the anonymity
and unlinkability goals. Therefore, it is computationally
difficult for an anonymous rider to perform these attacks.
In addition, the following goals guarantee that
PrivateRide is usable and economically viable.
(U1) Usability. The system provides approximately the
same level of convenience to riders and drivers, as in cur-
rent RHSs. For instance, riders are not required to perform
a significant number of additional steps to hail a ride.
(E1) Economic viability. The system preserves the
economic viability of the SP as in current RHSs. That
is, the SP can profit by charging a commission on each
ride and selling rides’ anonymous partial location traces to
other parties, e.g., for city planning [15]. The SP can also
benefit from partial anonymous ride data to improve its
services and capacity planning. In addition, the system is
cost-effective to deploy (e.g., compatible with current IT
infrastructure).
4.4 Privacy and Cryptographic Tools
PrivateRide uses well-established privacy and cryptographic
tools for ride-hailing settings, as briefly introduced below.
Such an approach is important because it increases the
likelihood of protocol understanding and the acceptance
by users and developers, e.g., predictable performance and
formal proofs.
Blind signatures. A blind-signature scheme [20] is a
form of digital-signature scheme in which the signature re-
quester disguises (blinds) her message before sending it to
the signer. The blind signature can in turn be ‘unblinded’,
to obtain a valid signature for the original message. The
key property of blind signatures that is important in
PrivateRide is that a signer who is asked to verify the
signature of an unblinded message is not able to link this
message back to the blinded version she signed.
Anonymous credentials. An anonymous credential
(AC) is a cryptographic token with which the credential
owner can anonymously prove to another party that she
satisfies certain properties. In PrivateRide, a user is identi-
fied when she obtains ACs, however later, when she wants
to start an anonymous session, she anonymously reveals to
the SP only the attributes that are needed to be allowed
to use the service. PrivateRide relies on the Anonymous
Credentials Light (ACL) system [13] because it is compu-
tationally efficient and provably secure. However, note that
ACL is a linkable anonymous credential scheme, i.e., a user
can only use a credential once to avoid her transactions
from being linkable.
E-cash. An e-cash scheme (e.g., [21]) enables secure and
private electronic payments by providing similar security
and anonymity as physical cash. The monetary value is rep-
resented by electronic coins that are pieces of data blindly
signed by the bank. When a payer deposits a coin to a
payee, the payee can check whether the coin has not been
deposited before. Properties of e-cash that are important in
PrivateRide include payment anonymity (i.e., the bank does
not know who is spending the coins) and payment unlinka-
bility (i.e., spendings of a user are not linkable by the bank).
Cloaking. Researchers have shown that removing users’
identities from their location-based requests might not
be sufficient to protect their anonymity [33]. To prevent
this, one of the most popular location-privacy techniques
is to cloak users’ locations such that k users appear as
potential senders of a query, thus achieving k-anonymity.
To do so, usually, there is a trusted anonymizer who re-
ceives location-based requests from users and adaptively
blurs their locations into cloaked spatial regions that sat-
isfy the user-specified k-anonymity level. In addition, the
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anonymizer can also cloak the time, i.e., delaying location
requests such that there are k users within the user-defined
time interval and the maximum location cloaking area [65].
We choose a static spatial- and temporal-cloaking ap-
proach, as it does not require additional parties and it
reduces the chances of fare-calculation errors. It works as
follows. For end-point locations of a ride, the SP generates a
quantized version of the coordinates (i.e., the SP discretizes
the region into a grid of two-dimensional areas). Assuming
that a user is located at a point loc=(x,y) in the Euclidean
plane, her cloaked location is a tuple ([x1,x2],[y1,y2]) that
specifies the two-dimensional area where she is located [34].
Hereafter, the precise location of a user is denoted as loc,
and the cloaked location of a location point loc is denoted
as loc. For rides’ pick-up and drop-off times, the SP dis-
cretizes the day into time epochs of a pre-defined value,
e.g., 2 minutes. The driver reports to the SP the time
intervals where the pick-up and drop-off events occur. For
example, if the time interval is 2 minutes, all the pickups
occurring between 0:00 and 0:02 would be reported to
the SP at 0:02. Thus, pickups in the same cloaked pick-
up location and in the same time interval would appear
indistinguishable from each other with respect to the SP.
4.5 PrivateRide Overview
In this section, we present an overview of PrivateRide and
the rationale behind its design.
Design options. Different privacy-enhancing technolo-
gies (PETs) could be used to improve privacy in RHSs. For
instance, anonymous matching of riders to drivers by us-
ing techniques such as secure multiparty computation [19]
or privacy-enhanced matchmaking protocols [40] can be
problematic. First, such techniques are complex and could
significantly degrade the overall performance of the system.
Second, the SP does not learn any information about the
ride, thus making accounting difficult, e.g., the SP cannot
charge a commission per ride without knowing the dis-
tance of the ride. This would also degrade the economic
viability of the system, i.e., the SP cannot benefit from the
anonymous ride data to improve its services or for capacity
planning. Third, providing anonymity to riders and drivers
makes accountability challenging, e.g., the SP will not be
able to identify and punish misbehaving riders or drivers.
Solving this problem often requires a trusted third-party;
however, this is not practical for RHSs. Hence, PrivateRide
focuses on balancing the trade-off between riders’ privacy,
the convenience of the service, and SP’s benefits by en-
abling riders to be anonymous during a ride and revealing
only partial ride information to the SP (Figure 1).
Design intuition. In PrivateRide, the rider obtains, in ad-
vance, ACs and e-cash from the SP. To hail a ride, she first
uses an AC to anonymously create a session to the SP, and
she sends to the SP her cloaked pick-up location. The SP
matches the rider to an available driver whose cloaked lo-
cation is the closest to the cloaked pick-up location. There-
after, the driver and rider will establish a secure channel
via the SP. This channel is used by the rider and driver to
exchange their exact locations and other identifiable infor-
mation that should not be observed by the SP. When the
driver and the rider are in proximity, they use a short-range
wireless technology (e.g., Bluetooth) to validate proxim-
ity, to prevent O→D PII-harvesting attacks. Upon success,
the driver sends her identifying information to the rider,
e.g., her profile photo, car registration plate, and then they
go about their ride. Ride-start and -end notifications are
sent to the SP at predetermined time intervals (e.g., every
2 min). Upon reaching the cloaked drop-off location, the
driver signals the end of the ride. The SP receives this noti-
fication in the next time interval and proceeds to compute
the ride fare and charge the rider. Optionally, the rider and
driver anonymously vote for the reputation of each other.
Challenges. The aforementioned design introduces sev-
eral technical challenges. First, the rider might want to
take advantage of her anonymity to misbehave, e.g., she
might attempt to underpay for her ride. Second, the anony-
mous reputation scheme must be non-monotonic and it
must guarantee that (1) a rider cannot arbitrarily create
a reputation token to rate herself or to rate other drivers,
(2) the rider cannot fool the driver into rating a different
rider, and (3) the SP cannot link a rider with a driver
through their reputation operations. To discourage rider
misbehavior, PrivateRide requires the rider to deposit to
the SP a fixed amount of e-cash when she requests a
ride. If the rider misbehaves, the SP can offer her two
options: to pay a penalty for the cancellation or to reveal
her identity to lower her reputation value. In addition, this
approach facilitates automatic payment at the end of the
ride. Moreover, to deal with the anonymous reputation
challenges, PrivateRide relies on a unique characteristic of
RHSs, i.e., the rider and the driver can build a secure chan-
nel between them; via this channel, the rider can prove
her identity to the driver, and they can exchange resources
that should not be seen by the SP. From the exchanged re-
sources, the rider and the driver create and exchange their
reputation tokens, so that they can rate each other after
the ride. In PrivateRide, a reputation token is a token that
enables its holder to anonymously vote for the reputation
of the party whose identity is contained in the token.
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5 PrivateRide Protocols
This section details the operations of PrivateRide. Table 3
contains the notations we use throughout the description
of our solution.
5.1 Ride Prerequisites
At registration time, each rider and driver is issued a
digital certificate signed by the SP, denoted as certr and
certd, respectively. The certificate contains a public key
and an ID pointing to the rider’s/driver’s registration in-
formation. Moreover, to anonymously hail a ride, a rider
first needs to acquire ACs and e-cash from the SP.3 These
two operations must be done in advance (i.e., they should
not be obtained right before the ride), in order to avoid
time-correlation attacks by the SP (i.e., to deanonymize
the riders, the SP might try to correlate the AC and e-
cash requests with the log-in and deposit events). We now
describe these two operations:
Buying e-cash. To buy e-cash, the rider sends a request
that contains her real credentials (e.g., certificate or user-
name/password) and the desired amount of e-cash to the
SP. The SP sends her the e-cash and charges her, using her
registered means of payment (e.g., her credit card). This
operation could be automatically done by the rider’s app:
Some random time after a ride is completed, the rider’s
app automatically buys e-cash from the SP to maintain a
user-defined, but unknown by the SP, amount of e-cash in
her local wallet. Random timing prevents time-correlation
attacks by the SP; the user-defined threshold of e-cash
balance prevents the SP from being able to deanonymize a
rider through her deposit amount. The e-cash is issued on
fixed denominations to avoid the linking of withdrawing
and spending operations.
Obtaining ACs. In PrivateRide, an AC is a cryptographic
token that enables its holder to anonymously create a ride
session. An AC for a rider r has three attributes: skr, repr
and exp, where skr is the secret key associated with the
public key in her certificate certr, repr is her reputation at
the time the AC is issued, and exp is the coarse-grained
expiry time of the AC to prevent the SP from being able
to deanonymize the users based on the expiry time of their
ACs (e.g., all ACs issued on the same day will expire at
the end of that day).
3 Note that some RHSs such as Ola Cab support the use of virtual
money [48].
Rider SP Driver
(1) locr, e-cash
(2) locr
(3) Accept, locd
(4) locd, repd
(5) Secure channel, exchange repr, locd and locr, compute PIN
(6) locd in real time
(7) Do proximity check, using PIN
(8) Identifying info: vehicle’s information, profile picture
Generate rr Generate rd
(9) cr=hash(rr)
(10) cd=hash(rd)
(11) BsigSP{certr,sigr{cd}}
(12) BsigSP{certd,sigd{cr}}
(13) RTr=sigSP{certr,sigr{cd}}
(14) RTd=sigSP{certd,sigd{cr}}
Fig. 3. Initiating a ride request. The dotted arrows
represent the proximity channel and the dashed arrows
represent the secure channel (via the SP).
Because the selected AC scheme is linkable (i.e., one-
time use, otherwise unlinkability is broken), PrivateRide
allows riders to obtain several ACs at a time (i.e., to hail
multiple rides). However, this approach means that the
reputation value included in the ACs might not be up-to-
date. To avoid abuse by possible misbehaving riders, the
ACs include an expiry date (e.g., one day). In addition, the
SP could broadcast a list of riders that have been banned
from the service. Based on this revocation list, before the
ride starts, the driver can check if the rider is eligible for
the service (more details in Section 5.2).
5.2 Ride Initiation
In this section, we explain how a rider and a driver log in to
the service. We then describe the actions performed by the
rider, the driver, and the SP when a ride request is issued.
5.2.1 Logging In to the Service
Rider. A rider uses her AC to anonymously log in to the
service, i.e., she sends to the SP the expiry date exp of her
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Notation Description
r, d Rider r and driver d
certx Public-key certificate of x
repx Reputation of x
locx Cloaked location of x
locx Precise locations of x
hash() A cryptographic hash function
cx Hash challenges send by x
rx Random number generated by x
sigx{m} Message m and digital signature
of x on message m
BsigSP(m) Blind signature of the SP on
message m
RTx Reputation token used to rate x
Table 3. Table of notations for Figure 3
AC (goals P1 and P2). In addition, she proves to the
SP, in a zero-knowledge fashion, that the claimed value is
correct, and that she knows the secret key skr that is tied
to the AC. If all the proofs are correct, the SP assigns a
one-time session ID to the rider, in order to keep track of
that session (e.g., for payment and coordination).
Driver. Unlike the rider, the driver logs in to the service
non-anonymously by using her real credentials, and she
periodically reports her cloaked location locd to the SP.
The driver is also assigned a one-time session ID by the SP.
For the sake of exposition simplicity, in the subse-
quent protocols, we omit the session IDs in the messages
exchanged between the rider or driver and the SP.
5.2.2 Initiating a Ride Request
Once the rider is logged in, she can initiate a ride request
to the SP. At this stage, the main purpose of the system is
four-fold: (1) the SP matches a rider to a driver, based on
their cloaked locations, (2) the driver can verify the prox-
imity of the rider before sending his identifying information
to the rider, (3) the rider and the driver securely exchange
their private information with each other (e.g., their precise
locations, the vehicle’s information and the rider’s reputa-
tion score repr), and (4) the rider and the driver create
and exchange their reputation tokens, so that they can rate
each other after the ride. In PrivateRide, a reputation token
is a token that enables its holder to anonymously vote for
the reputation of the party whose identity is contained in
the token. The protocol is illustrated in Figure 3.
1. The rider sends her cloaked pick-up location locr and,
optionally, her cloaked destination, to the SP. She also
makes a deposit to the SP of a fixed amount of e-cash
defined by the SP. The deposit is linked to the session
ID of the rider, and it is used as a disincentive for
client misbehavior, as will be discussed in Section 5.5.
2. The SP matches the rider to a driver, based on their
cloaked locations. Note that this could result in sub-
optimal matching between ride requests and offers, as
will be discussed in Section 8.3. It then sends to the
driver the rider’s cloaked pick-up location locr.
3. The driver accepts the request and sends her latest
cloaked location to the SP. Otherwise, the driver can
decline and the SP can try with different drivers.
4. The SP sends to the rider the cloaked location locd
and the reputation rating repd of the driver.
5. The rider and the driver establish a secure channel via
the SP e.g., using Diffie-Hellman protocol to exchange
data that should not be observed by the SP. From the
information used to derive the secret key of the secure
channel, they compute a shared secret pairing PIN .
This pairing PIN will be used to prove that the rider
is in the proximity of the driver (step 7). Once the chan-
nel is established, the rider and the driver use this chan-
nel to exchange their exact locations (i.e., locr and locd,
respectively). Using this channel, the rider can also re-
veal and prove her reputation value to the driver using
her AC. The driver can abort the protocol at this step,
if the rider’s reputation is too low.
6. The driver starts driving from her location locd to the
pick-up location locr, using her third-party or off-line
navigation app. She sends, in real time, her precise
locations to the rider, via the secure channel, hence
the rider can track the movements of the car. Also, at
this point, the rider and the driver can call or message
each other through their ride-hailing apps, if needed.
7. When the rider and the driver are in proximity, they
use a short-range wireless technology (e.g., Bluetooth
or WiFi Direct) to set up a proximity channel using
the pairing PIN .4 If the channel is successfully estab-
lished, the driver can verify that the rider is in her
proximity before releasing her identifying information
to the rider (in step 8). This prevents the harvesting
attack described in Section 3.3 (goal P3). If this step
fails, the driver can decide to abort the protocol.
8. The driver sends to the rider, via the secure channel,
her identifying information (e.g., license-plate num-
ber and profile picture). This information helps the
rider to identify the driver and her car and to prevent
4 As discussed in Section 7, this proximity channel can also be
used to detect MITM attacks by the SP in step 5.
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certain threats, e.g., fake drivers [25]. Therefore, the
required communication distance between the phones
of the rider and the driver is small (e.g., several me-
ters). Note that the driver’s identifying information is
not used by the rider to decide whether to accept a
ride with the driver, such a decision is made earlier in
the protocol (steps 3-4).
In the subsequent steps, the rider and the driver follow
a challenge-response protocol over the secure channel
to create and exchange their reputation tokens. For the
sake of simplicity, when a cryptographic signature on
a message m is sent from one entity to another entity,
we imply that the original message m is also sent.
9. The rider sends cr to the driver, where cr is the
cryptographic hash of a random number rr.
10. Similarly, the driver sends cd to the rider, where cd is
the cryptographic hash of a random number rd.
11. The rider creates her reputation token RTr =
sigSP{certr, sigr(cd)}, as follows. First, she creates
a message consisting of her certificate and her signa-
ture on cd. She then interacts with the SP to obtain
a blind signature on the message. This signature and
the hash cd guarantee that a rider cannot arbitrarily
create a reputation token and use it to rate herself. In
addition, the fact that there is no driver information
included in the token provides unlinkability between
the rider and the driver (more details in Section 6).
12. As in the previous step, the driver creates her reputa-
tion token RTd=sigSP{certd, sigd(cr)}.
13. The rider sends RTr to the driver. The driver checks
the correctness of the SP’s signature, whether certr
is valid and has not been blacklisted by the SP, and
whether cd is correctly signed w.r.t. the public key
specified in certr. If any of the checks fails, the driver
can report the failure to the SP, which can take ac-
tions accordingly. For example, the SP can charge a
penalty to the rider before returning her e-cash back
or can request the rider to reveal her identity before
returning her e-cash (goal S2).
14. The driver sends RTd to the rider. The rider validates
it, as described in the previous step. If any of the
checks fail, the rider can report the driver to the SP.
The ride begins once the exchange of reputation to-
kens between the rider and the driver is completed. The
driver starts reporting the exact location to the SP when
the car exits the cloaked pick-up area and stops doing so
when entering the cloaked drop-off area. The exact pick-up
and drop-off times are not revealed to the SP. Instead, the
closest time intervals in the future are reported (see Sec-
tion 4.4). If the car exits the cloaked pick-up area before
the next time interval, then the pick-up time is the time
interval previous to exiting the cloaked area.
5.3 Ride Termination
The main purpose of this procedure is to enable the SP
to charge the rider from her session deposit and pay the
driver. First, the SP computes the ride’s fare, using the
cloaked pick-up and drop-off locations and cloaked times,
and the location trace outside of the cloaked areas reported
by the driver. Note that this could affect the accuracy of
fare calculation, as will be discussed in Section 8.3. Next,
based on the one-time session-ID of the rider and the
driver, the SP finds the rider’s deposit and puts it in the
billing information of the driver.
If the rider’s anonymous session is still active at the
end of the ride, the SP returns to her the remaining e-cash
from her deposit. Otherwise, later, the rider can send an
anonymous request with her session-ID to be reimbursed.
If the deposit is not sufficient to pay for the ride, the SP
can ask the rider to deposit more e-cash. If the rider refuses
to do so, the SP asks the driver to reveal the rider’s cer-
tificate certr and reputation token RTr (goal S2). With
this information, the SP can revoke the rider’s anonymity
and charge her directly. This situation should not happen
frequently, i.e., only when the rider runs out of e-cash in
her rider’s app. Also, the rider’s location privacy is still pro-
tected by the cloaking of her pick-up and drop-off locations.
5.4 Reputation Rating
In this section, we describe how the rider and the driver
use the reputation tokens that they received during ride
initiation (Section 5.2) to rate each other. The reputation
rating is optional and asynchronous.
In PrivateRide, it is important to note that, in order to
avoid time-correlation attacks by the SP, the rating should
not occur right after the ride. This can be implemented by
imposing some random delay after the ride before reputa-
tion rating for that ride can occur. In addition, the rider
and the driver do not provide their identifying information
to the SP during the reputation rating. That is, the IP ad-
dresses and real credentials of the riders and drivers are not
known to the SP. This, together with the fact that there is
no information of the token holders included in the token,
provides unlinkability between the rider and the driver.
Rider. The rider sends to the SP the reputation to-
ken RTd = sigSP{certd,sigd(cr)} received from the driver,
the random number rr used to generate the hash cr, to-
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gether with the ride’s rating. When the SP receives this
token, it checks the correctness of the signature, the cor-
rectness of the certificate certd, whether cr has not been
used before and whether cr matches with the hash of rr.
Driver. The driver sends to the SP the reputation to-
ken RTr = sigSP{certr,sigr(cd)} of the rider, the random
number rd used to generate the hash cd, together with the
ride’s rating. The SP does the same checks as described
above for the rider.
5.5 Ride Cancellation
As in current RHSs, both the driver and rider can cancel
the ride at any point. However, ride cancellation is discour-
aged by the SP, because it can lead to malicious behavior
from the rider and the driver. Therefore, similarly to cur-
rent RHSs, in PrivateRide, if riders or drivers cancel a ride
a certain amount of time after the ride request, they are
punished by the SP, e.g., their reputation scores are low-
ered or fees are charged . For example, a Uber rider would
be charged a $10 cancellation fee if she cancels more than
5 minutes after her ride request [18]. If the driver cancels a
ride, the SP can punish the driver directly, as her identity is
not hidden. If the rider cancels a ride before the reputation
tokens are generated (step 11 in Figure 3), the SP can offer
the rider two options: pay a penalty for the cancellation
or reveal her identity and have her her reputation value
lowered. This offers a trade-off to deter misbehaviors. If the
rider cancels the ride after the reputation tokens are gener-
ated, then the driver will lower the rider’s reputation using
the token (without revealing the identity of the rider to the
SP). The driver should also invalidate his reputation token
by revealing it to the SP. As stated before, ride cancella-
tions should not occur frequently and even when the rider
anonymity is revoked, her location privacy is still protected
by the cloaking of her pick-up and drop-off locations.
6 Privacy Analysis
In this Section, we present our analysis of PrivateRide to
show it achieves its privacy goals, i.e., P1, P2, and P3
in Section 4.3, w.r.t. different assumptions about the side
information known by the SP.
Dataset. To assess the performance of our solution, we
rely on a dataset of NYC taxi rides in New York [63]. This
dataset provides the pick-up and drop-off locations and
times, the total fare, and information about the drivers.
We selected all the valid rides from a random weekday
(e.g., rides with reported distance higher than zero). From
this set, we chose rides of which the pickups are from the
boroughs of Manhattan. This results in 489,479 rides with
length of 2.4 ± 2.6 km. These boroughs are chosen due
to their high density of places of interests and activities,
compared to other boroughs, hence the locations of people
would be more sensitive.
6.1 SP→ R location tracking (goals P1, P2)
PrivateRide guarantees rider’s anonymity and unlinkability
throughout its operations, as we explain next.
Log-in and payment. Provided that a rider uses two
different ACs for two login sessions, the SP cannot link
the two login sessions with each other. It also cannot
deanonymize a user through her anonymous login using
her AC. These are guaranteed due to the anonymity and
unlinkability properties of the ACL anonymous credential
scheme [13]. The SP cannot deanonymize or link different
rides of a rider through the e-cash tokens that she deposits,
due to the anonymity and unlinkability guarantees of e-
cash [16, 17, 21]. The SP also cannot deanonymize a user
based on the amount of her e-cash deposit, because the
deposit amount is fixed and defined by the SP; from the
NYC dataset mentioned above, if the fixed deposit amount
is set to $20, it would cover 90% of the rides. Moreover,
the SP cannot deanonymize a past ride of a rider based
on the time she buys e-cash and/or the amount that she
buys, because the e-cash acquisition operation occurs at a
random time after a ride finishes and the e-cash balance
threshold set by the rider app is not known by the SP.
The SP, however, might try to make time-correlation
attacks to break the anonymity of riders (by correlating AC
and e-cash requests with login and deposit events), because
the SP serves as the issuer of ACs and e-cash, and the rid-
ers are identified when they obtain these resources. That is,
if a rider obtains an AC and e-cash, and in a short time in-
terval, she logs in and makes a deposit to the SP. If in that
time interval, there is only one login event, the SP would
be able to link that ride with the rider who just obtained
the AC (i.e., the rider’s anonymity is broken). Given the
fact that recently, Uber outnumbers taxis in NYC [5], and
from the NYC dataset, there are, on average, respectively,
530 and 47 ride requests per minute, during peak hour and
least-busy hour, a rider would have a good anonymity set of
size at least 47 if the time gap between her AC and e-cash
request and AC and e-cash deposit is at least a minute.
Reputation rating. The SP might try to deanonymize
a rider by looking at the reputation tokens that have been
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in a random weekday in Manhattan.
used to vote for her and guessing the rides where these to-
kens were generated. However, it is computationally diffi-
cult for the SP to do so because, when a reputation token is
generated (during ride initiation), it is blindly signed by the
SP, hence the SP cannot link the unblinded token with the
blinded token it signed before, as guaranteed by the blind-
ness property of blind signature schemes [20]. In addition,
the unblinded reputation token is sent over a secure chan-
nel established between the rider and the driver, hence not
readable by the SP. A concern could be that the SP might
try to find the set of rides taken by a rider by guessing the
identities of the drivers who rate for that rider’s reputa-
tion. This, however, is not possible because the information
about the drivers is not included in the rider’s reputation to-
kens and the drivers do not provide any identifying informa-
tion to the SPwhen they rate a rider. In addition, given two
reputation tokens that are used to rate the same rider, the
SP cannot link together the two rides where the tokens were
generated, because the reputation tokens do not contain
any information about the rides or any information gener-
ated by the SP, other than the SP’s signature on the tokens.
End-point location and time cloaking. The level of
privacy protection offered by location and time cloaking de-
pends on the amount of information the SP has about the
riders. In an extreme case, the SP might know the identity,
as well as the exact or approximated location and time
when a particular rider hailed a ride. The SP can use this
information to link the rider’s identity to an anonymous
ride in its database and determine the rider’s destination.
For instance, the SP has a photo of a celebrity hailing
a ride in the street and it wants to learn the celebrity’s
destination [55]. In such a situation, the protection offered
by PrivateRide is proportional to the number of rides that
occur in the same cloaked area and time interval, i.e., the
size of the anonymity set.
To estimate the anonymity set of a ride in PrivateRide,
we use the NYC dataset described earlier. Figure 4 shows
the experimental cumulative distribution function of the
anonymity set for time intervals of 2 minutes and three
different sizes of the cloaked pickup: 200 m× 200 m, 600 m
× 600 m and 1 km× 1 km, at the peak hour (from 7 PM to
8 PM) and the least-busy hour (from 4 AM to 5 AM) of the
day. The results show that for cloaking areas of size 600 m
× 600 m, a ride would have a good anonymity set: During
the peak hour, 80% of the rides would have an anonymity
set of at least 4 and 40% of rides would have an anonymity
set of at least 10; and during the least-busy hour, 50% of
the rides would have an anonymity set of at least 2. As
expected, a larger cloaking area provides more privacy for
the riders, e.g., with cloaking size of 1000 m × 1000 m,
during least-busy hour, nearly 80% of the rides would have
an anonymity set of at least 2, and during the peak hour,
80% of the rides would have an anonymity set of at least 10.
The anonymity set is likely to be lower in areas with
less commercial activity and population (e.g., residential
areas); however, we need to take into account that this is
strong and non-scalable attack that is unlikely to affect
most riders. Still, PrivateRide, in contrast with current
RHSs and traditional taxi services, provides some level
of protection against such attacks. In the worst case sce-
nario of rural areas where there is only a single house in
a cloaked area, it is likely that ride requests coming from
that area belong to people living in that house. However,
the attacker still has a certain uncertainty, because the
requests might also come from other people, e.g., visitors.
Also note that people living in such areas are less likely
to rely on RHSs/taxis for they daily activities and rides in
such cases are likely to have lower privacy implications.
In general, the SP knows only some basic information
about most riders. Similarly to other location-based ser-
vices, a reasonable assumption for RHSs is that the SP
knows publicly available information about riders’ homes
and work places [33]. Thus, rides between a rider’s home
and work are generally easier to link and deanonymize than
other rides. Nevertheless, the former normally reveal less
sensitive information about the rider. Of more interest for
the SP or other adversaries, are rides that are less frequent
and to different type of destinations. With PrivateRide, if
the SP wants to learn the destinations of the rides starting
from home or work of a particular rider, without any addi-
tional side information, the size of the anonymity set in this
case is at least equal to the number of riders living or work-
ing in the same cloaked area as the targeted rider (the size is
larger if we consider riders temporarily visiting the cloaked
area and hailing rides). Unfortunately, due to the lack of
datasets about the geographic distribution of RHS’ riders,
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we could not quantify the privacy gain for these cases. This
is a limitation in our work. Nevertheless, it is easy to see
that, in general, the size of the anonymity set should be
significantly larger than in the previously described attack
where the SP knew the exact time and location of a ride.
Similarly, large-scale inference attacks, e.g., to learn where
riders go shopping [45], clubbing, or to learn which rid-
ers have one-night stands [49], are more difficult for the
SP without additional information to determine the exact
pick-up and drop-off locations or to link the observed rides.
Note that the results presented in this section are the
lower-bound privacy gain, because a rider does not have to
do anything in order to obtain this level of protection. A
more privacy-conscious rider can have better privacy pro-
tection, if, instead of always hailing a ride from the same
cloaked pick-up location, she uses different neighboring
cloak areas or she selects busier cloaking areas. Also, as
discussed in Section 4.4, a trusted third-party tool could be
used to suggest riders what nearby cloaked pick-up areas
provide better privacy based on the rider’s ride history and
the ride density in each cloaked area.
6.2 O→ D PII harvesting (goal P3)
In the current form of RHSs, a malicious outsider can
easily harvest PII from drivers: it could create a rider ac-
count, fake different pick-up locations, make ride requests,
obtain drivers’ information and then cancel the ride re-
quests. This is possible, because the drivers’ information
is revealed to the riders right after the riders are matched
with the drivers. With PrivateRide, the driver can easily
check the proximity of the rider by using a short-range
wireless communication channel before sending her PII to
the rider. Thus, to collect PII from drivers, a malicious
outsider not only needs to make a ride request but also to
be physically close to the pick-up location reported (see
Section 8 for performance evaluation of this operation).
7 Security Analysis
We analyze PrivateRide to show that it maintains the same
level of security as current RHSs: Miscreants can be pun-
ished when they misbehave (goal S1); the riders and
drivers cannot lie about their reputation scores; and they
cannot cheat on the commission of the rides (goal S2).
In this analysis, we assume that riders and drivers might
attempt attacks against the integrity of the system. For ex-
ample, riders might attempt to underpay for their rides or
unduly increase their reputation; drivers might attempt to
overcharge riders or unduly increase their reputation. In ad-
dition, we show that active attacks mounted by the SP can
be detected by riders and drivers with minor modifications.
Riders. A rider might want to arbitrarily increase her
reputation. First, during ride initiation, a dishonest rider
can attempt to cheat by claiming a better reputation for
herself. However, this would be detected by the driver,
because the proof for attributes in her AC will not be
correct w.r.t. her falsely claimed reputation [13].
A dishonest rider might also want to arbitrarily create
a reputation token and rate herself, in order to improve her
reputation. This attack is prevented because a rider cannot
obtain a signature from the SP on her reputation token if
she is not associated with an on-going ride. A dishonest
rider might also want to prevent the driver from rating her,
as follows: After generating her reputation token, she uses
it to rate herself before sending it to the driver (i.e., when
the driver uses the token to rate the rider, the SP would
detect that the token had been used hence refuse to ac-
cept the rating). PrivateRide prevents this by requiring the
rider, during the reputation-rating protocol, to reveal the
random number rd that was used as the input of the cryp-
tographic hash function to generate the hash challenge (cd)
included in the reputation token. Assuming the one-way
property of the cryptographic hash function holds, it is
computationally impossible for the rider to find this rd,
hence her cheating attempt fails. Another concern could
be that a dishonest rider might want to avoid being rated
by faking her identity in her reputation token (so that the
rating would go for someone else). This attack is prevented,
because when the driver receives the reputation token from
the rider, the driver can check if the signature on the hash
challenge cd that she sent to the rider is correctly signed
w.r.t. the public key in the certificate claimed by the rider.
Drivers. A dishonest driver might want to unduly create
a reputation token and rate herself, in order to improve
her reputation. This attack is prevented, with the same
reasoning as presented above for the riders, because the
rider and the driver follow the same procedure for voting
for the reputation of each other. A dishonest driver might
want to overcharge a rider, by e.g., reporting to the SP a
longer route for the ride. PrivateRide offers the same guar-
antees against this overcharging attack, as in current RHSs,
because they both rely on the information reported by the
driver’s phone; in future work, we will explore mechanisms
to protect against this type of attacks.
A dishonest rider and a dishonest driver might want
to collude with each other, in order to falsely increase the
reputation scores for both of them: the rider makes a ride
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request with her pick-up location close to the location of
the driver, so that they are assigned to each other by the
SP. Then they can have valid reputation tokens and use
them to give good ratings for each other. This attack, how-
ever, is monetarily expensive, hence not scalable, because
each trip is charged a commission by the SP. A dishonest
rider and a dishonest driver might want to cancel the
ride earlier than its actual end, in order to underpay for
the commission of the ride. This, however, can be pre-
vented by PrivateRide, because when a rider or a driver
cancels a ride, the SP will punish them by lowering their
reputation according to its service policies. The driver is
identified during the ride, hence this punishment operation
is straightforward. For the rider, PrivateRide enables this
punishment operation by allowing the SP to revoke her
identity, i.e., it requests the misbehaving rider to reveal
her identity, in order to get her deposit reimbursement.
The SP. PrivateRide was presented under the assumption
of an honest-but-curious SP, however, with some minor
modifications, it can be resistant to some active attacks
performed by the SP. First, a malicious SP might want
to perform man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack (at step 5),
in order to get the precise pick-up location of the rider
and her reputation score. This can be easily detected by
the rider and the driver: Via the proximity channel, the
rider and the driver can cross-check that the tokens they
exchanged through the SP to establish the secure channel
were not altered (i.e., the SP did not perform a MITM
attack). Second, a malicious SPmight want to fool a driver
into revealing the identity of the rider who rides with him:
the SP could tell the driver that the rider did not deposit
enough for the ride, hence it needs to revoke the rider’s
anonymity, in order to charge her directly from her reg-
istered billing information. This, however, can be easily
prevented, by allowing the rider to get a deposit certificate
from the SP each time she deposits. The rider can send her
deposit certificate to the driver to prove to the driver that
she pays enough for the ride. Note that in practice, for the
sake of its reputation, a SP would certainly not take the
risk of being caught carrying out such an attack.
8 Implementation and Evaluation
In this section, we experimentally evaluate PrivateRide’s
performance overhead. We use real data-sets to estimate
PrivateRide’s effect on fare calculation and ride matching.
8.1 Implementation Details
PrivateRide’s prototype includes the main cryptographic
operations needed for requesting a ride (i.e., AC operations,
blind signatures) and for setting up the proximity chan-
nel between two phones. For the server, we implemented
PrivateRide as an HTTP server in Python by using the
Flask framework [26]. For ACL operations, we rely on the
petlib library [6]. For RSA blind and standard signatures,
we use the Python Cryptography Toolkit (pycrypto) li-
brary [54]. For the client, we implemented PrivateRide as an
Android application with support for Android v4.4 (SDK
19) and later versions. For ACL operations, we ported the
ACL client classes from the petlib library to Java. For RSA
blind- and standard- signature support we use the Spongy
Castle library [56]. Because Spongy Castle’s implementa-
tion of elliptic curves (EC) modular multiplications is not
efficient in mobile devices, we implemented EC modular
multiplications in native C code by using a cross-compiled
version of the OpenSSL library v1.0.1r and the Android
NDK [24]. For the proximity channel, we implemented
both Bluetooth and WiFi Direct technologies.
8.2 System Performance
Experimental Setup. We used PrivateRide’s prototype
to estimate the overhead added by the most complex cryp-
tographic operations in the protocols used to hail a ride
(Section 5). For this evaluation, we used a server (8x3.5GHz,
16 GB RAM) with Ubuntu 12.04 (kernel 3.2) and a smart-
phone LG G3 (4x2.5 GHz, 2 GB RAM) with Android
5.0. To make our scenario more realistic, the smartphone
communicated with the server over a 4G cellular network
connection. We considered two sets of security parameters.
First, ACs with an EC group of 521 bits (OpenSSL’s
secp521r1), a value recommended for 128 bits security5
[13], and 4096 bits RSA keys for blind signatures. How-
ever, such level of security might not be required in most
RHSs scenarios. Thus, we also considered a slightly weaker
set of parameters, probably more appropriate for RHSs:
an EC group of 224 bits (value recommended by NIST
for EC encryption [9]) and 2048 bits RSA keys. We ran
100 experiments per measurement and report hereunder
average values with 95% confidence intervals.
Cryptographic Operations. The total time to obtain
an AC credential was 554.2±21.8 and 962.8±20.8 ms for
5 ACL’s authors recommend an EC group of 576 bits but
OpenSSL’s largest secure EC group has 521 bits (secp521r1).
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the basic (EC 224 bits) and strong (EC 521 bits) security
parameters respectively. Logging in with the AC took in
total around 218.9 ± 4.9 ms for the basic configuration
and 558.8± 23.7 ms for the strong configuration. Blind
signatures, as expected, are significantly more efficient:
67.8±2.1 and 71.0±1.9 ms for the basic and the strong
configurations, respectively. Therefore, logging in and gen-
erating the reputation token will add around 600 ms to
ride hailing operations for the strong configuration, which
is unlikely to be noticed by a rider. Furthermore, buying
and spending e-cash is also practical. For example, assum-
ing that we use ACL for e-cash [37] and an EC group of
224 bits, obtaining a e-cash token will take around 500 ms
and spending it around 200 ms. This overhead is practical,
especially if we take into account that buying e-cash should
be done in advance to requesting a ride.
Proximity Check. We implemented an app for set-
ting up short-range communication channels between two
phones. The app supported two technologies: Bluetooth
and WiFi-Direct. For each technology, we measured the
time needed to set up the channel in two scenarios: (1) a
phone is inside a car and the other phone is in open space,
and (2) both of the phones are in open space. Our experi-
ments show that, for both scenarios, on average, setting up
the proximity channel takes only around 6.4 s for Bluetooth
and around 4.5 s for WiFi Direct. Regarding the maxi-
mum communication distance between two phones, for the
second scenario, it can be as far as 30 m and 50 m, for
Bluetooth and WiFi Direct, respectively. This distance, for
both technologies, decreases to 15 m for the first scenario.
The supported distance is adequate for our scenario,
because this operation is expected to occur when the
rider is waiting outside, just before the driver arrives, at
the precise pick-up location agreed with the driver (Fig.3,
step 5). Moreover, its effect on usability is negligible, as
it can be executed automatically in the background with
little effort from riders and drivers. Note that the feasi-
bility of the short-range communication channel is also
reported in other works, e.g., Murphy et al. [43] show even
more optimistic results; they show that it would take less
than 2 s to establish a Bluetooth channel between two
Bluetooth-enabled devices.
8.3 Effect of Location Cloaking
We evaluate the effect of location cloaking on the perfor-
mance of PrivateRide, in terms of the error induced on the
fare calculation and the resulting sub-optimality of the ride
matching. We do so for three different sizes of the cloaking
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Fig. 5. Effect of location cloaking for different sizes of
the cloaking areas, on fare calculation (left) and on ride
matching (right).
areas: 200 m × 200 m, 600 m × 600 m, and 1000 m ×
1000 m; this provides different levels of location privacy.
Datasets. To assess the performance of our solution, we
rely on two data-sets: a data-set of GPS traces of Uber
black cars rides in San Francisco [32] (the SF data-set) and
a data-set of NYC taxi rides in New York [63] (the NYC
data-set). The SF data-set consists of 22,570 rides with
an average length of 2.1±1.9 km. Note that the rides are
short because the beginning and the end of the GPS traces
were truncated in the published data-set. We considered
only rides that were longer than 500 m and that lasted
for at least 2 min. The NYC data-set was described in
Section 6; this dataset does not provide the GPS traces
of the rides, however, the pick-up and drop-off locations
and time are provided. Based on these specifics of the two
data-sets, we used the SF dataset to assess the effect of
location cloaking on fare calculation, and the NYC dataset
to assess the performance of ride matching.
Performance of Fare Calculation. As explained in
Section 5.3, in PrivateRide, the SP computes the fare of
the ride, based on the cloaked pick-up and drop-off loca-
tions, the trace outside of the cloaks and the duration of
the ride, as reported by the driver. This forces the SP to
define a cloak-based fare-computation method; of course,
the fare computed in this way should be close to the fare
computed with the original method of RHSs. Intuitively,
a reasonable estimation of the distance covered inside the
cloak is a quantity proportional to the time interval and
the perimeter of the cloaking area. We determined the op-
timal coefficient of proportionality by performing a linear
regression with least square error between the ground truth
(i.e., the fare calculated when the full trace is known) and
the cloak-based method. Note that this pricing method is
somewhat similar to the zone-based fare system used by
public transport authorities.
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Figure 5a shows the experimental cumulative distribu-
tion function of the relative error on the cloak-based fare
method (compared to that computed by Uber); negative
errors indicate that the rider is undercharged (i.e., pays
less) for the corresponding ride. The results show that the
cloak-based fare method achieves good performance: for
cloaking areas of size 600 m × 600 m, 95 % of rides would
have a relative error of less than 10%, and, as expected, the
smaller the cloaking areas are, the better the cloak-based
fare method performs. In addition, the average of the rel-
ative errors is close to 0 (with a small variance); therefore,
as the number of rides taken by the same rider/driver
increases, the fare errors quickly average out to 0.
Performance of Ride-Matching. In order to match
ride requests to ride offers, based on the cloaked locations
reported by the riders and the drivers, the SP defines a met-
rics for measuring the distance between two cloaked areas.
The ride-matching based on this metric should be close to
the optimal solution (i.e., when cloaking is not used, the SP
assigns to a rider the driver who is the closest to the pick-up
location). In PrivateRide, we use the straight-line distance
between the centers of the two cloaking areas (note that
more advanced metrics could be used, e.g., by taking into
account the road network and the traffic conditions).
Figure 5b shows the experimental cumulative distri-
bution function of the relative extra distances the drivers
who are chosen by the cloak-based matching method have
to drive. The relative extra distance is computed w.r.t.
the distance covered by the driver chosen by the optimal
matching method in which cloaking is not used. This value
reflects the extra costs for both the driver (gas and driving
time to pickup) and the rider (waiting time at pickup). It
can be observed that the extra pick-up distance is small:
In 78% of the cases, the overhead is less than 0.1km, for
the cloaking areas of size 600 m × 600 m.
9 Related Work
We found only one prior work directly related to RHSs, by
Chen et al [22]. The authors investigate the effect of surge
pricing on Uber users and identify implementation details
of Uber’s surge price algorithm. However, the work does
not discuss or analyze privacy aspects of Uber.
In the line of privacy-enhancing technologies for
RHSs, prior works include privacy-preserving solutions
for car-pooling services, public transportation services
and distance-based services. Friginal et al. [30] propose
a distributed solution for privacy-preserving car-pooling
services. However, car-pooling is different from ride-hailing
in that, in car-pooling, drivers offer rides to people along
the route they already plan to travel, whereas RHSs enable
people to use their own cars as taxis. Heydt-Benjamin et
al. [36] proposed one of the first cryptographic frameworks
for transport services. They discuss the challenges that
a privacy-preserving transit system should solve. Later,
m-ticketing solutions were proposed, such as [10, 38].
Note that the pick-up and drop-off locations in public
transportation services (i.e., bus or train stops) are more
coarse-grained than in RHSs.
Privacy-preserving solutions for location-based services
that charge users based on the distance that they drive in-
clude solutions for electronic toll pricing (e.g., [12, 41, 52])
and pay-as-you-drive car insurance (e.g., [62]). These solu-
tions rely on tamper-evident devices installed in the vehi-
cles and random spot-checks to compute the total distance
traveled by the vehicles. Later on, Pham et al. [51] proposed
a solution based on the networks of access points, to provide
a verifiable lower-bound of the distance reported by a user.
10 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed the privacy threats in the
current form of RHSs. We have also proposed PrivateRide,
a practical solution that enhances location privacy for the
riders w.r.t. the SP and privacy for the drivers w.r.t. ma-
licious outsiders, while preserving the convenience and
functionality offered by the current system.
The experimental evaluation on our PrivateRide proto-
type implementation of the rider’s app and the ride-hailing
server shows that PrivateRide introduces a negligible delay
for the cryptographic operations and for the proximity-
check operation. Our analysis on the real data-set of rides
shows that PrivateRide guarantees good location privacy
for the riders. This is achieved with only minor effect on
the service’s usability, e.g., 95 % of the rides would have
a relative error on fare calculation of less than 10%. From
an economic perspective, PrivateRide can offer SPs a com-
petitive advantage not only over other RHSs but also over
conventional taxi services, as those services also collect
riders’ PII for reservations and business analytics purposes.
As such, this work lays the foundation for the design of a
privacy-preserving and secure RHS.
As part of future work, we plan to (1) enhance the
design to be resistant to more attacks defined in our threat
taxonomy, (2) formally analyze the privacy and security
properties of PrivateRide, and (3) investigate cases of collu-
sion between drivers and the SP, e.g., if some drivers work
for the SP or the SP makes use of driverless cars.
PrivateRide: A Privacy-Enhanced Ride-Hailing Service 17
References
[1] http://rideshareapps.com/2015-rideshare-infographic/. Last
visited: May 2016.
[2] http://www.dailydot.com/technology/uber-female-driver-
harassment/. Last visited: May 2016.
[3] http://www.reuters.com/article/uber-tech-lyft-probe-exclusive-
idUSKBN0U12FH20151219. Last visited: May 2016.
[4] http://www.bbc.com/news/business-35888352. Last visited: May
2016.
[5] http://www.engadget.com/2015/03/18/uber-outnumbers-taxis-
in-nyc/. Last visited: May 2016.
[6] https://github.com/gdanezis/petlib. Last visited: May 2016.
[7] http://www.businessinsider.com/blake-jareds-50000-uber-credit-
free-rides-for-life-2014-4. Last visited: May 2016.
[8] http://fortune.com/2015/03/30/uber-stolen-account-
credentials-alphabay/. Last visited: May 2016.
[9] Cryptographic key length recommendation. http://www.
keylength.com/en/. Last visited: May 2016.
[10] G. Arfaoui, J.-F. Lalande, J. Traoré, N. Desmoulins,
P. Berthomé, and S. Gharout. A Practical Set-Membership Proof
for Privacy-Preserving NFC Mobile Ticketing. Proc. of the 15th
Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium, 2015.
[11] Y. Aumann and Y. Lindell. Security against covert adversaries:
Efficient protocols for realistic adversaries. In Theory of
cryptography. Springer, 2007.
[12] J. Balasch, A. Rial, C. Troncoso, B. Preneel, I. Verbauwhede,
and C. Geuens. PrETP: Privacy-Preserving Electronic Toll
Pricing. In Proc. of USENIX Security Symposium, 2010.
[13] F. Baldimtsi and A. Lysyanskaya. Anonymous credentials light.
In Proc. of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer &
communications security, 2013.
[14] http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-28/one-
driver-explains-how-he-is-helping-to-rip-off-uber-in-china. Last
visited: May 2016.
[15] www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/01/13/uber-share-
ridership-data-with-boston/4Klo40KZREtQ7jkoaZjoNN/story.
html. Last visited: May 2016.
[16] S. Brands. Electronic cash systems based on the representation
problem in groups of prime order. Proc. of the 13th Cryptology
Conference, 1993.
[17] J. Camenisch, J. Piveteau, and M. Stadler. An efficient
payment system protecting privacy. Proc. of the 9th European
Symposium on Research in Computer Security, 1994.
[18] https://newsroom.uber.com/updated-cancellation-policy/. Last
visited: Nov. 2016.
[19] R. Canetti. Studies in secure multiparty computation and appli-
cations. PhD thesis, The Weizmann Institute of Science, 1996.
[20] D. Chaum. Blind signatures for untraceable payments. In Proc.
of the 3rd Cryptology Conference, 1983.
[21] D. Chaum, A. Fiat, and M. Naor. Untraceable electronic cash.
In Proc. of the 10th Cryptology Conference, 1990.
[22] L. Chen, A. Mislove, and C. Wilson. Peeking Beneath the
Hood of Uber. In Proc. of the ACM Conference on Internet
Measurement Conference. ACM, 2015.
[23] http://www.cnet.com/news/taxi-dispute-gets-physical-in-france-
with-attack-on-uber-car/. Last visited: May 2016.
[24] https://developer.android.com/tools/sdk/ndk/index.html. Last
visited: May 2016.
[25] http://nypost.com/2016/09/10/fake-uber-drivers-are-
scamming-tourists-at-us-open/. Last visited: Nov. 2016.
[26] http://flask.pocoo.org/. Last visited: May 2016.
[27] http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/10/03/god-
view-uber-allegedly-stalked-users-for-party-goers-viewing-
pleasure/. Last visited: May 2016.
[28] www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2014/09/08/uber-lyft-cars-
arrive-faster-than-taxis/#3f819c3c5f73. Last visited: May 2016.
[29] http://www.forbes.com/sites/ronhirson/2015/03/23/uber-the-
big-data-company/. Last visited: May 2016.
[30] J. Friginal, S. Gambs, J. Guiochet, and M.-O. Killijian. Towards
privacy-driven design of a dynamic carpooling system. Trans.
on Pervasive and Mobile Computing, 2014.
[31] https://gigaom.com/2014/11/21/if-youre-worried-about-uber-
and-privacy-dont-forget-lyft-and-sidecar/. Last visited: May
2016.
[32] https://github.com/dima42/uber-gps-analysis/blob/master/
gpsdata/. Last visited: May 2016.
[33] P. Golle and K. Partridge. On the anonymity of home/work
location pairs. In Proc. of the Conference on Pervasive
Computing, pages 390–397. Springer, 2009.
[34] M. Gruteser and D. Grunwald. Anonymous usage of location-
based services through spatial and temporal cloaking. In Proc. of
the 1st international conference on Mobile systems, applications
and services, 2003.
[35] http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/may/23/us-
investigates-phantom-cab-rides-on-british-uber-accounts. Last
visited: May 2016.
[36] T. S. Heydt-Benjamin, H.-J. Chae, B. Defend, and K. Fu.
Privacy for public transportation. In Proc. of the 6th Privacy
Enhancing Technologies Symposium, 2006.
[37] G. Hinterwälder, C. T. Zenger, F. Baldimtsi, A. Lysyanskaya,
C. Paar, and W. P. Burleson. Efficient e-cash in practice:
NFC-based payments for public transportation systems. In Proc.
of the 13th Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium, 2013.
[38] A. P. Isern-Deyà, A. Vives-Guasch, M. Mut-Puigserver,
M. Payeras-Capellà, and J. Castellà-Roca. A secure automatic
fare collection system for time-based or distance-based services
with revocable anonymity for users. The Computer Journal,
2013.
[39] http://jetsettershomestead.boardingarea.com/2015/01/08/ways-
passengers-can-cheat-uber/. Last visited: May 2016.
[40] M. Li, N. Cao, S. Yu, and W. Lou. Findu: Privacy-preserving
personal profile matching in mobile social networks. In Proc. of
the Conference on Computer Communications. IEEE, 2011.
[41] S. Meiklejohn, K. Mowery, S. Checkoway, and H. Shacham.
The Phantom Tollbooth: Privacy-Preserving Electronic Toll
Collection in the Presence of Driver Collusion. In Proc. of the
20th USENIX Security Symposium, 2011.
[42] http://money.cnn.com/2014/08/11/technology/uber-fake-ride-
requests-lyft/. Last visited: May 2016.
[43] P. Murphy, E. Welsh, and J. P. Frantz. Using bluetooth for
short-term ad hoc connections between moving vehicles: a
feasibility study. In Vehicular Technology Conference, 2002. VTC
Spring 2002. IEEE 55th, volume 1, pages 414–418. IEEE, 2002.
[44] M. Naveed, S. Kamara, and C. V. Wright. Inference attacks on
property-preserving encrypted databases. In Proc. of the ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2015.
[45] http://newsroom.uber.com/2014/09/inferring-uber-rider-
destinations/. Last visited: May 2016.
PrivateRide: A Privacy-Enhanced Ride-Hailing Service 18
[46] https://news.yahoo.com/warning-uber-account-might-sale-
black-market-164144470.html. Last visited: May 2016.
[47] http://www.newsweek.com/uber-taxi-e-hailing-riding-app-
travis-kalanick-emil-michael-josh-mohrer-uber-285642. Last
visited: May 2016.
[48] https://www.olamoney.com/. Last visited: May 2016.
[49] http://www.oregonlive.com/today/index.ssf/2014/11/sex_the_
single_girl_and_ubers.html. Last visited: May 2016.
[50] www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Risk_Rating_
Methodology. Last visited: May 2016.
[51] A. Pham, K. Huguenin, I. Bilogrevic, and J.-P. Hubaux. Secure
and Private Proofs for Location-Based Activity Summaries in
Urban Areas. In Proc. of the 16th ACM International Joint
Conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing, 2014.
[52] R. A. Popa, H. Balakrishnan, and A. J. Blumberg. VPriv:
Protecting Privacy in Location-Based Vehicular Services. In Proc.
of the 18th USENIX Security Symposium, 2009.
[53] R. A. Popa, C. M. S. Redfield, N. Zeldovich, and H. Balakrish-
nan. Cryptdb: Protecting confidentiality with encrypted query
processing. In Proc. of the ACM Symposium on Operating
Systems Principles, 2011.
[54] https://pypi.python.org/pypi/pycrypto. Last visited: May 2016.
[55] http://research.neustar.biz/2014/09/15/riding-with-the-stars-
passenger-privacy-in-the-nyc-taxicab-dataset. Last visited: May
2016.
[56] https://rtyley.github.io/spongycastle/.
[57] http://sfist.com/2014/07/30/uber_still_illegally_working_sfo_
al.php. Last visited: May 2016.
[58] http://thehub.lyft.com/blog/2014/10/15/cancelations-join-
acceptance-rate-equation. Last visited: May 2016.
[59] http://therideshareguy.com/uber-deactivated-a-bunch-of-
drivers-as-an-intimidation-tactic/. Last visited: May 2016.
[60] http://www.thewire.com/technology/2014/08/uber-accused-of-
booking-thousands-of-fake-rides-with-rival-lyft/375936/. Last
visited: May 2016.
[61] http://toddwschneider.com/posts/analyzing-1-1-billion-nyc-taxi-
and-uber-trips-with-a-vengeance/. Last visited: May 2016.
[62] C. Troncoso, G. Danezis, E. Kosta, J. Balasch, and B. Preneel.
Pripayd: Privacy-friendly pay-as-you-drive insurance. Trans. on
Dependable and Secure Computing, (5), 2011.
[63] https://uofi.app.box.com/NYCtaxidata. Last visited: May 2016.
[64] http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/11/19/uber-
privacy-tracking/19285481/. Last visited: May 2016.
[65] M. Wernke, P. Skvortsov, F. Dürr, and K. Rothermel. A
classification of location privacy attacks and approaches.
Personal and Ubiquitous Computing, 2014.
[66] http://wspa.com/2016/01/18/uber-driver-off-the-job-after-he-
charged-for-fake-puke-2/. Last visited: May 2016.
A Integrity threats
Table 4 presents a taxonomy for integrity threats in RHSs.
Integrity Threats
Description Risk
1) R→ D fare undercharging [39] Low
2) R→ SP reputation cheating Low
3) R→ SP incentives abuse [7] Low
4) D →R fare overcharging [66] High
5) D→ D ride matching cheating [57] Low
6) D→ SP reputation cheating Low
7) D→ SP fees and incentives cheating [14] Medium
8) O→ R,D account theft [8, 35] High
Table 4. Integrity threat taxonomy for RHSs (Risk-RH)
based on four possible adversaries: riders (R), drivers
(D), service provider (SP), and outsiders (O). The
notation X→Y means X attacks Y.
B Threat Taxonomy Details
In Table 5, we present a more detailed description of
the main threats against current RHSs introduced in Sec-
tion 3.2 and the key reasons for their associated risk level.
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Privacy Threats
Description Risk Risk Level Explanation
1) A malicious rider collects PII from drivers
assigned to her.
Low Medium impact: semi-scalable attack due to system design, limited reputation
damage for the SP. Low likelihood: only few riders might attempt such attacks
due to the reward, few reported incidents [2]
2) A malicious driver collects PII from riders she
is assigned to.
Low Low impact: non-scalable attack due to system design, limited reputation
damage for the SP. Low likelihood: only few drivers might attempt such attacks
due to the reward, no reported incidents.
3) A curious SP is able to track, sometimes in real-
time, riders’ precise location during their rides and
infer private information from the data observed.
High High impact: large scale inference attacks, significant reputation damage for
the SP. High likelihood: ride data is collected by the SP by design, significant
financial gain, reported incidents of misuse of this data [27, 31, 49].
4) A curious SP is able to track, sometimes in real-
time, drivers’ precise location while on service and
infer private information from the data observed.
Medium Medium impact: large scale inference attacks, drivers’ ride data reveal less
private information, reputation damage for the SP. Medium likelihood: ride
data is collected by the SP by design, privacy-inference analysis is more difficult,
less reward than riders data.
5) A malicious outsider can collect riders’ PII in
large scale by exploiting weaknesses on the services
offered by the SP.
Medium High impact: large scale attack, significant reputation damage to SP.
Low likelihood: considerable reward, difficult to exploit because SP’s services
exposed little rider information, requires higher attack skills, no reported incidents.
6) A malicious outsider can collect drivers’ PII in
large scale by exploiting weaknesses on the services
offered by the SP.
High High impact: scalable due to system design, possible privacy violation of
thousands of individuals, harvested data could be used to physically attack
drivers. High likelihood: valuable information for some adversaries, system design
facilitates the attack, current security mechanisms provided limited protection,
reported related incidents [42, 60].
7) Malicious outsider gains (partial or total)
unauthorized access to the SP’s rider and/or driver
registration databases.
High High impact: significant reputation damage to the SP, possible privacy violation
for millions of individuals. High likelihood: significant reward for the adversary,
very common attack against online services, reported incidents [3].
Integrity Threats
Description Risk Risk Explanation
1) A malicious rider exploits a weakness on the
system to pay lower fares.
Low Low impact: non-scalable, limited financial loss, affects a small number of drivers.
Medium likelihood: riders have limited input on fare calculation operations,
limited financial gain, reported incidents [39], attacks are easy to detect.
2) A malicious rider exploits weaknesses on the
system to improperly increase her reputation
(e.g., to hide misbehavior).
Low Low impact: non-scalable, limited reputation and financial cost to the SP.
Low likelihood: rider reputation does not have high value, riders have little control
over reputation operations, it may be easier to create a new rider account.
3) A malicious rider improperly accumulate
incentives offered by the system for financial gain.
Low Low impact: limited financial and reputation cost to the SP, incentives are
location-dependent, SP can invalidate incentives. Medium likelihood: few inci-
dents reported [7], interesting rewards for riders, abuse is easy to detect .
4) A malicious driver exploits weaknesses on the
system to improperly charge riders a higher fare
and/or fees.
High High impact: large-scale attack if tools are made available, considerable
reputation damage for the SP. Medium likelihood: drivers provide the inputs for
fare calculation, smartphones are relatively easy to tamper with, direct financial
gain, some related incidents has been reported [57, 66].
5) A malicious driver fakes her location or availability
to increase her chances of being assigned to a ride.
Low Low impact: limited scalability (only useful in some scenarios), limited financial
impact to other drivers. Medium likelihood: attack is easy to execute, available
tools, direct financial reward, reported incidents [7].
6) A malicious driver exploits weaknesses in the
system to improperly increase her reputation.
Low Medium impact: scalable if tools are made available, considerable reputation
and financial loses for SP (e.g., , bad drivers are not banned). Low likelihood:
difficult to exploit as drivers have read-only access to reputation information,
significant motivation, no reported attacks.
7) A malicious driver exploits weaknesses on the
system to improperly avoid fees or obtain incentives
from the SP.
Medium Medium impact: scalable if tools are made available, significant financial loses
for the SP, incentives are location-dependent. Medium likelihood: significant
financial motivation, reported incidents [14], some attacks are easy to detect.
8) A malicious outsider steals riders’ and drivers’
accounts by attacking the SP drivers or riders.
High High impact: scalable attack, significant financial impact to riders and SP,
significant reputation damage to the SP. High likelihood: common attack
against online services, reported incidents [8], considerable reward.
Table 5. Extended description and explanation of risk level for the main threats of RHSs presented in Table 1
(Section 3.2).
